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This case requires us to address the difficult balance the state secrets doctrine strikes
between fundamental principles of our liberty, including justice, transparency,
accountability and national security. Although as judges we strive to honor all of these
principles, there are times when exceptional circumstances create an irreconcilable
conflict between them.
—Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan 1
INTRODUCTION
Britel’s captors hang him from the ceiling of a decrepit cell and beat him
with a cricket bat.2 After a few weeks of sleep deprivation beatings, he confesses
to being a terrorist.3 At one moment Britel is told that his interrogators will kill
him if he does not cooperate—soon after they tell him he will get to return home
to Italy.4 Instead, he is flown to Morocco where he is kept in squalid conditions
for eight years.5 Despite having all charges against him dismissed, Britel remains in
Ain Bourja Prison in Casablanca.6 A lawsuit is brought on his behalf in the United
States against the corporation that took part in his rendition, for violating his most
basic human rights.7 The case is dismissed.8 The reason: state secrets.9
The state secrets doctrine exists in an area of inherent tension. Victims often
bring legitimate claims seeking compensation for wrongs, errors, or mistreatment
by government officials. However, when litigation of a claim necessitates the
exposure of sensitive, secret, government material, such as documents related to
the search for terrorism suspects or the identity of undercover intelligence
officers, the government also has a legitimate interest in ensuring that that
sensitive material does not become public. This balance is controlled by two
different strands of the state secrets doctrine: the Totten 10 bar to litigation, which
acts as a nonjusticiability doctrine, and the Reynolds 11 evidentiary privilege, which
excludes evidence that contains state secrets.
The Totten-Reynolds dichotomy has generally allowed judges to prevent
disclosure of state secrets without dismissing legitimate claims. More recent
decisions have dramatically altered this balance. Two cases in particular, Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan12 and El-Masri v. United States,13 exemplify the disturbing
alteration of this traditional doctrine. El-Masri and Jeppesen are uniquely worthy of
1. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. First Amended Complaint at 26, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen I), 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 26–27.
5. Id. at 27–31.
6. Id. at 31.
7. See Complaint, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07CV02798).
8. Id. at 1136.
9. Id.
10. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
11. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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analysis because even though the courts analyzed them as Reynolds cases, they alter
the doctrine in a way that privileges facts, rather than evidence. In essence, these
cases prevent plaintiffs from pursuing each evidentiary avenue to proving a fact,
regardless of whether that avenue is protected by the state secrets privilege. This
expands the evidentiary privilege that each court was using into the realm of a
nonjusticiability doctrine, similar to Totten. Jeppesen and El-Masri have dangerously
broadened the state secrets doctrine through the conflation, both doctrinally and
in application, of the Reynolds evidentiary privilege and the Totten bar. Ironically,
the resulting doctrine does not, in fact, increase protection of secret, sensitive
material.
El-Masri and Jeppesen are factually similar in that the plaintiffs’ claims in both
cases arose from extraordinary rendition and torture. In one case, five plaintiffs
were at different times, kidnapped, tortured, and imprisoned in CIA “Black
Sites,”14 including Kabul’s infamous “Dark Prison.”15 Several remain incarcerated
in foreign countries.16 Although this similarity does not bear on the application of
the doctrine itself, it highlights the highly sensitive nature of the evidence the
government seeks to protect in state secrets cases and the importance of the civil
rights at stake.
This Note will assume that there is a need for a state secrets doctrine.
Because the existence of the doctrine has been so passionately debated for
decades, the scope of this Note is limited to recent developments in the doctrine
and solutions to the problem of balancing the need for secrecy and government
accountability.17
Part I of this Note will provide the essential history of the Reynolds and Totten
doctrines. Part II will use the plaintiffs in Jeppesen as a case study to illustrate the
lifecycle of a modern state secrets case. This is useful for two reasons: first, it
demonstrates the very complex nature of state secrets cases; second, it highlights
the enormous danger of dismissing such cases. Part III will explain the
dysfunctional analysis the El-Masri and Jeppesen courts used to effectively
restructure the state secrets privilege as an immunity or nonjusticiability doctrine.
12. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan (Jeppesen III), 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
13. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
14. The black sites are CIA interrogation facilities, clandestinely operated throughout the
world. For an image of a black site, the story of Mohamed Bashmilah is illustrative. See Mark
Benjamin, Inside the CIA’s Notorious “Black Sites,” SALON (Dec. 15, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.salon
.com/2007/12/15/bashmilah/singleton.
15. The Dark Prison, formally known as the “Salt Pit,” is a Black Site located in Kabul and
known for keeping its prisoners in complete darkness. See Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet,
Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html.
16. The facts of Jeppesen are discussed at length in Part II.
17. For a debate about the need for a state secrets privilege, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME
OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006).
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Part V will advocate for an alternative method of analysis for the state secrets
privilege and offer several solutions to the problem of litigating matters that
involve state secrets. Specifically, this Note advocates for the creation of a subject
matter court to handle sensitive state secrets cases, thereby minimizing the
dismissal of legitimate claims and disclosure of sensitive information.
I. THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE: ITS BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT
The state secrets doctrine emerged as a common law rule of evidence, but
courts have since expanded it into a rule of constitutional scope. This expansion
was primarily caused by the executive branch’s persistent and repeated
propounding of the argument that authority over military secrets is
constitutionally committed to the executive and that it is improper for the
judiciary to interfere in this regard.18
A. The Totten Bar or Nonjusticiability Doctrine
The first and oldest case, Totten v. United States, created the state secrets bar to
litigation.19 In that case, a former Union spy from the Civil War sued the U.S.
government alleging that he was never paid under the terms of his contract made
with President Abraham Lincoln.20 The Court dismissed the case because the
contract was of a type that required secrecy and precluded judicial enforcement.
The Court explained the purpose of the bar:
An action cannot be maintained against the government, in the court of
claims, on a contract for secret services during the war, made between the
president and the claimant. Conceding the engagement to be valid, it is of
a nature requiring secrecy. If upon contracts of such a nature an action
against the government could be maintained in the Court of Claims,
whenever an agent should deem himself entitled to greater or different
compensation than that awarded to him, the whole service in any case,
and the manner of its discharge, with the details of dealings with
individuals and officers, might be exposed, to the serious detriment of the
public.21
Totten has been interpreted as a justiciability or jurisdictional limitation,22
although recent interpretations of Totten resemble an immunity doctrine.23 It has

18. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1931, 1935 (2007) (“The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that derives
from the President’s authority over national security, and thus is imbued with ‘constitutional
overtones.’”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”).
19. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
20. Id. at 105–06.
21. Id. at 106.
22. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 12 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 12 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing the
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since rarely been invoked. Totten has been used in cases where “the very subject
matter” of the case was a state secret, in particular cases concerning espionage
agreements with the government like the one in Totten (the “very subject matter
theory” of the state secrets doctrine).24 Both Totten and Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme
Court’s most recent invocation of Totten, were premised on contracts for U.S.
government spies. In Tenet, two foreign spies defected to assist the United States
with espionage activities, with the alleged understanding that they would receive
“financial and personal security for life.”25 When the U.S. government failed to
fulfill its end of the bargain, the two former spies sued.26 The Court dismissed the
case using Totten and explained the doctrine.27 It wrote, “Totten precludes judicial
review in cases such as respondents’ where success depends upon the existence of
their secret espionage relationship with the Government.”28 Although the
Supreme Court never explicitly limited Totten to espionage agreements, the Court’s
language in Tenet points in that direction: “When invoking the ‘well established’
state secrets privilege, we indeed looked to Totten. But that in no way signaled our

“justiciability doctrine of Totten v. United States”); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493
F.3d 644, 650 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Totten rule is a “rule of non-justiciability”);
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the
Totten rule is “a rule of nonjusticiability, akin to a political question”).
23. There are important similarities and differences between nonjusticiability and immunity.
Traditional nonjusticiability doctrines direct courts to refrain “from the exercise of judicial power in
situations that might overly infringe on the prerogatives of another branch of government,” or where
a case does not constitute a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution due to
standing, ripeness or mootness problems. Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emp. v. White, 418 F.2d 1126, 1130
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (regarding separation of powers); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–96 (1968)
(regarding “case or controversy” requirements). Consequently, nonjusticiability must be addressed,
like jurisdiction, before “a federal court may proceed to any other question.” Galvan v. Fed. Prison
Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 462–63 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998)). Immunity, while technically a defense, is similar to a nonjusticiability doctrine
in that it has also been characterized as “jurisdictional.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). In
fact, some courts have chosen to address immunity defenses before nonjusticiability doctrines. See,
e.g., In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, unlike nonjusticiability, immunity
does not completely prevent a court from hearing a case. Immunity does prevent a court from
enjoining the defendant’s conduct or ordering the defendant to compensate the plaintiff, but in some
cases a court might still rule on the underlying constitutional claim. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009) (holding that courts may use their discretion to decide constitutional claims before
qualified immunity). As a practical matter, Totten’s characterization as one or the other is largely
unimportant because both doctrines prevent the plaintiff from recovering. However, as more and
more cases are dismissed as nonjusticiable and the trend begins to resemble an immunity doctrine, it
sends a strong message to plaintiffs and defendants that government entities will not be held
responsible for such conduct.
24. See, e.g., Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (evaluating an
agreement between AT&T and the National Security Agency to disclose telephone records under the
Totten standard).
25. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3–4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 8.
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retreat from Totten’s broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage
agreements are altogether forbidden.”29
One colorful description of Totten comes from Ben Wizner, counsel for the
plaintiffs in Jeppesen, who described Totten as a “buyer-beware” rule, rather than a
“victim-beware” rule.30 In other words, Totten only bars litigation by “buyers”—
plaintiffs who have consciously entered into an agreement or relationship with the
government. The burden is on the “buyers” to recognize that they may have to
keep the relationship hidden and assume that risk as an implicit condition of the
agreement. In comparison, Totten is less likely to bar litigation from “victims”—
plaintiffs who interacted with the government against their will. Courts have even
described Totten as a contract doctrine,31 which bars enforceability of government
contracts that were secret at the time of their formation.32 The invocation of Totten
is thus premised on the notion that the plaintiff knowingly entered into a secret
agreement with the government.33
B. The Reynolds Evidentiary Privilege
The other line of cases comes from Reynolds, which created the state secrets
evidentiary privilege used in Jeppesen and El-Masri.34 Although there is no exact
definition of what type of evidence is privileged, Reynolds generally applies to
evidence concerning national security or military matters. In Reynolds, families filed

29. Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
30. Oral Argument at 3:55, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693EB),
available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702.
31. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“The implicit
notion in Totten was one of equitable estoppel: one who agrees to conduct covert operations impliedly
agrees not to reveal the agreement even if the agreement is breached. But AT & T, the alleged spy, is
not the plaintiff here. In this case, plaintiffs made no agreement with the government and are not
bound by any implied covenant of secrecy.”); see also Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 39
Fed. Cl. 434, 440 (1997) (“Under Totten v. United States, contracts to perform ‘secret services’ for the
United States are unenforceable in court.”) (internal citation omitted).
32. Guong v. United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The words of the
Supreme Court are clear and unambiguous that ‘[b]oth employer and agent must have understood
that the lips of the other were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter.’
Hence, it cannot be doubted that Totten stands for the proposition that no action can be brought to
enforce an alleged contract with the government when, at the time of its creation, the contract was
secret or covert) (internal citations omitted).
33. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan (Jeppesen II), 579 F.3d 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Under the Totten principle, “a suit predicated on the existence and content of a secret agreement
between a plaintiff and the government must be dismissed on the pleadings because the ‘very subject
matter’ of the suit is secret.”).
34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (“It may be possible to satisfy the court,
from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.”).
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a wrongful death action after a government plane crashed, killing three civilians.35
The plaintiffs moved for the Air Force’s official accident investigation report
during discovery proceedings.36 The government, using a letter from the secretary
of the Air Force, claimed that the documents were privileged under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 34 and that it would best serve the public interest if they
were not produced.37 Despite this, the district court ordered the government to
produce the documents so that the court could determine whether the claim of
privilege was valid.38 When the government still refused, the district court
sanctioned the government by deciding the issue of negligence in the plaintiffs’
favor.39 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.40
The Supreme Court sided with the government, writing,
We think it should be clear that the term “not privileged” as used in
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 34, refers to “privileges” as that
term is understood in the law of evidence. When the Secretary of the Air
Force lodged his formal “Claim of Privilege,” he attempted therein to
invoke the privilege against revealing military secrets, a privilege which is
well established in the law of evidence.41
Thus, the Reynolds evidentiary privilege was born as a derivative of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 34.
The Court then laid out the procedure for the proper invocation of the
privilege:
There must be formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal
consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.42
Although the court must normally examine the evidence to ensure that the
invocation of the privilege is legitimate, there are times when “the court should
not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting

35. Id. at 2–3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6–7 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876), Cresmer v. United
States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y.
1939), Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912), Bank Line v.
United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947), Bank Line v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2212(a), at 161, and 2378(g)(5), at 785 (3d ed. 1940), 1
GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE §§ 250–51 (16th ed. 1899), and Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the
Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (1950)).
42. Id. at 7–8 (internal citations omitted).
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upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.”43 In
these cases, the judge should decide whether or not to deem the evidence
privileged without examination.44 Reynolds gives the court a balancing test to use to
evaluate whether or not evidence should be excluded. Assuming that the
government satisfies the procedures for invocation, the court should consider “the
circumstances of the case” and weigh the interests of the plaintiff against “the
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
interests of national security, should not be divulged.”45 Once the court has
deemed the evidence privileged, the privilege absolutely makes the evidence
unavailable.46 Although cases have been dismissed after the invocation of the
privilege,47 typically, litigation can proceed as long as the “plaintiffs can prove the
essential facts of their claims without resort to [privileged evidence].”48
C. Reynolds and Totten as Distinct Doctrines
During the course of the development of the doctrines, litigants and courts
have, at times, erroneously considered Reynolds and Totten to be one and the
same.49 However, the Supreme Court made clear in Tenet that they are, in fact,
distinct doctrines. Tenet v. Doe, decided in 2005, is the Supreme Court’s most
recent state secrets case. In that case, two former CIA spies sued the CIA for
financial assistance when they fell on hard times.50 They alleged violations of both
substantive and procedural due process, among other claims.51 The Supreme
Court unanimously dismissed the case, finding that the case fell into the realm of
Totten: “Totten precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents’ where
success depends upon the existence of their secret espionage relationship with the
Government.”52 In dismissing the case, the Court specifically linked Totten to
espionage agreements,53 although the Court never explicitly excluded the use of
Totten in other cases.

43. Id. at 10.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 9–10.
46. Id. at 11.
47. See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
48. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) (responding to and rejecting the Court of Appeals’
argument that “Totten has been recast simply as an early expression of the evidentiary “state secrets”
privilege, rather than a categorical bar to their claims”); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8–9
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (using Totten and Reynolds interchangeably).
50. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3–4 (2005).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id. at 9 (describing “Totten’s broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage
agreements are altogether forbidden”).
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The Court did, nonetheless, draw a line between the two doctrines:
Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be read to have replaced the
categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state secrets evidentiary
privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend upon clandestine spy
relationships. . . . There is, in short, no basis for respondents’ and the
Court of Appeals’ view that the Totten bar has been reduced to an
example of the state secrets privilege.54
Despite this clarification, before and after Tenet, courts have confused Totten and
Reynolds as closely overlapping. The expansion or overlapping of Totten presents a
very real danger. The Reynolds privilege is broad enough to apply to a diverse and
large number of cases. Totten, which requires dismissal of the entire case, was
designed to be narrowly confined to the small subset of cases where the plaintiffs
more than likely chose to form a relationship with the government.55 Expanding
Totten into the realm of Reynolds means that dismissal will become more frequent,
thereby limiting government transparency and eliminating some legitimate claims.
Further, Totten cases exist in a zone of purely presidential authority. By widening
the boundaries of this zone, presidential authority becomes more difficult to
monitor.
II. A CASE STUDY: THE EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND TORTURE OF THE
JEPPESEN PLAINTIFFS
In order to understand the implications of Jeppesen and El-Masri, it is
important to examine the context in which these cases have developed. Both the
recent history of extraordinary rendition in the United States and the individual
history of the Jeppesen and El-Masri plaintiffs shed light on the holdings of these
cases.
A. A Brief History of Extraordinary Rendition in the United States
Courts have defined extraordinary rendition as “the clandestine abduction
and detention outside the United States of persons suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities, and their subsequent interrogation using methods

54. Id. at 9–10.
55. Cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw. Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146–47
(1981). In Weinberger, the Supreme Court applied Totten to a case where environmentalists sued the
Department of Defense for compliance with environmental laws, which would have led the
government to disclose the locations of nuclear weapons facilities. This is the one Totten case that did
not involve a voluntary relationship between the plaintiff and the government. In fact, Jeppesen relied
on Weinberger in holding that Totten applied to cases outside of those where the plaintiff voluntarily
entered into a relationship with the government. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). However, because the Weinberger Court cited to Totten only once, and even then as more of an
afterthought, Weinberger is more properly considered a deviation from the traditional rule. This
interpretation is also supported by Tenet, which suggested that a relationship with the government is
required for Totten to apply.
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impermissible under U.S. and international laws.”56 The use of rendition began
under President Bill Clinton and continued, arguably to a greater degree, under
President George W. Bush.57 In President Clinton’s original Presidential Decision
Directive, extraordinary rendition was specified as a counterterrorism method.58 In
testimony before the Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee, then CIA
Director George Tenet explained that, in the years leading up to September 11,
2001, the CIA and FBI had “rendered 70 terrorists to justice around the world.”59
The American media was largely devoid of reports on extraordinary
rendition until 2005.60 In February 2005, Jane Mayer, a journalist with the New
Yorker, published an extensive and widely cited exposé titled Outsourcing Torture: The
Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program.61 Since its publication,
there has been extensive public debate and examination of the CIA’s extraordinary
rendition program.
The U.S. government has also publicly recognized the existence of the
extraordinary rendition program. For instance, in December of 2005, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice stated:
For decades, the United States and other countries have used
“renditions” to transport terrorist suspects from the country where they
were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can
be questioned, held, and brought to justice. In some situations, a terrorist

56. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Disappearing Act:
Rendition by the Numbers, MOTHER JONES, Mar. 3, 2008, http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/
disappearing-act-rendition-numbers (defining extraordinary rendition as “the extrajudicial transfer of
an individual to a country where there is a reasonable probability he will be tortured”). International
sources have defined extraordinary rendition similarly. See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE, RENDITION, 2007, Cm. 7171, at 6 (U.K.), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/
resource-library/intelligence-and-security-committee-special-ad-hoc-reports (defining extraordinary
rendition as “[t]he extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the
purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system . . . .”).
57. David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but with More Oversight, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2009, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html.
58. Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 21, 1995),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
59. George Tenet, Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence
Before the Joint Inquiry Committee (Oct. 17, 2002), available at https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/speeches-testimony/2002/dci_testimony_10172002.html.
60. The one exception is the case of Maher Arar, which began in 2002. Maher Arar’s story
could be the subject of substantial study in its own right. For early reports relating to his extraordinary
rendition, see, for example, Anthony DePalma, Threats and Responses: Detainee; Canadian Immigrant Arrested
at J.F.K. Is Deported to Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/10/12/us/threats-responses-detainee-canadian-immigrant-arrested-jfk-deported-syria.html; see also,
Daniel J. Wakin, Threats and Responses: Deportations; Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back
to Syria on Terror Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/11/11/world/threats-responses-deportations-tempers-flare-after-us-sends-canadian-citizen.html.
61. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition”
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/
02/14/050214fa_fact6.
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suspect can be extradited according to traditional judicial procedures. But
there have long been many other cases where, for some reason, the local
government cannot detain or prosecute a suspect, and traditional
extradition is not a good option. In those cases the local government can
make the sovereign choice to cooperate in a rendition. Such renditions
are permissible under international law and are consistent with the
responsibilities of those governments to protect their citizens.62
President Bush, in fact, in 2006 “publicly disclosed the existence of a CIA
program in which suspected terrorists are detained and interrogated at locations
outside the United States.”63 And on September 16, 2001, Vice President Dick
Cheney discussed the government’s new outlook on security in the wake of AlQaeda’s violent attacks on the World Trade Center on the television news
program “Meet the Press.”64 In that appearance, Vice President Cheney stated that
the government needed to
Work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in
the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here
will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and
methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be
successful. That’s the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be
vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our
objective.65
Despite pre-election indications to the contrary, the extraordinary rendition
program has continued under the Obama administration.66
B. The “Dark Side”: The Allegations of the Plaintiffs in Jeppesen
The allegations of plaintiff Abou Elkassim Britel (also described in the
introduction to this Note) are emblematic of the severe harm allegedly suffered by
the Jeppesen plaintiffs. According to his first amended complaint,67 Britel was an
Italian citizen travelling to Iran and Pakistan in order to obtain financing to
support his translation work and to conduct research on Islamic issues.68 On
March 10, 2002, while in Pakistan, he was arrested by the Pakistani police on

62. Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks upon Her Departure for Europe (Dec. 5,
2005), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/terrorism/state/57602.pdf.
63. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007).
64. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001).
65. Id.
66. See Johnston, supra note 57; Jacob Sullum, Torture Tort Terror, REASON.COM (Sept. 15,
2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/15/torture-tort-terror.
67. The accounts of the plaintiffs derive from the allegations made in their lawsuit against
Jeppesen Dataplan. See First Amended Complaint, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). The case was dismissed at the pleading stage. Because of this, it is unclear
whether and to what extent the government contests this narrative.
68. Id. at 25.
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immigration charges.69 Held at an interrogation facility, Britel was physically and
psychologically tortured.70 He was beaten with a cricket bat and hung from the
ceiling for extensive periods of time.71 Succumbing to the torture, Britel falsely
confessed to being a terrorist, as he was asked to do, and was brought before U.S.
officials who fingerprinted, photographed, and threatened him.72 He was then
flown, allegedly by Jeppesen Dataplan, to the Témara prison in Morocco where he
was kept in total isolation, outside of routine beatings, for eight months.73 Britel
was released in February 2003, but Moroccan law enforcement officers arrested
him just three months later after a suspected terrorist bombing.74 Held for four
months in the Témara prison once more, Britel signed a false confession under
duress and was later convicted by a Moroccan court of terrorism charges and
sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.75 Britel remains incarcerated in Ain Bourja
Prison in Casablanca.76 Eighty-seven members of the Italian Parliament have
petitioned for his release, and an Italian judge in 2006 dismissed all terrorism
charges against Britel, finding a complete lack of evidence.77 Britel nonetheless
remains imprisoned in Morocco.78
The stories of the other Jeppesen plaintiffs reveal similarly outrageous harms
and emphasize the need to minimize unnecessary dismissal of such cases. Plaintiff
Binyam Mohamed was a twenty-eight year old Ethiopian citizen living in the
United Kingdom. After U.S. officials suspected that Mohamed had ties with
Al-Qaeda, Jeppesen Dataplan allegedly flew him to a CIA dark prison in
Afghanistan and later to the prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.79 After over six
years in custody, a federal judge found that Mohamed was unlawfully detained and
granted his petition for habeas corpus.80
Plaintiff Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza’s ordeal traces all the way
back to the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1982.81 Agiza sought asylum
in Sweden after being tried in absentia in Egypt for allegedly belonging to an illegal

69. Id.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 27–29.
74. Id. at 29–30.
75. Id. at 30–31.
76. Id. at 31.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
80. Mohamed’s release and background are discussed in Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp.
2d 38, 61 (D.D.C. 2009); see also R. (on the application of Mohamed) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65, [2011] QB 218 (appeal taken from Divisional Court)
(Eng. & Wales).
81. See First Amended Complaint at 31, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798
(JW)).
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organization.82 Jeppesen Dataplan then flew Agiza to Egypt at the direction of
U.S. officials.83 Agiza remains incarcerated in a maximum security prison in Egypt
where his health continues to deteriorate.84 According to the plaintiffs, the
Swedish government has publicly acknowledged Agiza’s account and granted his
family refugee status.85 The Swedish government also provided $450,000 in relief
to Agiza for its secondary role in his rendition.86
Plaintiff Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah’s rendition began, like others,
with immigration charges. Bashmilah, a Yemeni citizen, used a falsified Indonesian
identity card to marry an Indonesian woman.87 Picked up on immigration charges
in Yemen, Bashmilah was placed in a CIA dark prison where he was exposed to
constant white noise and alternating deafening music. In fact, Bashmilah was so
tormented that he slashed his wrists in an attempt to bleed to death, then used his
own blood to write “I am innocent” on the walls of his cell.88 In March of 2006,
he was released by the Yemeni government for time served.89
Plaintiff Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi citizen and permanent British resident.90
From 1996 through 2002, al-Rawi worked as an interpreter for MI5 (a British
secret service agency) and as an intermediary between MI5 and Abu Qatada, a
Muslim cleric.91 In 2002, al-Rawi flew to Gambia with several friends with the
intention of starting a mobile peanut oil processing facility.92 Arrested by British
authorities for having a “suspicious device” that later turned out to be a battery
charger, al-Rawi was taken to a dark prison in Afghanistan. In 2003, al-Rawi was
flown to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where he was held for four and a half years
before being returned to Britain.93 He was never charged with any crime.94
In 2007, the European Parliament adopted a report concluding that the CIA
had carried out extraordinary renditions of Mohamed, Britel, Agiza, and al-Rawi.95
Separately, the Council of Europe, the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman
of the Swedish Government, and the British All Party Parliamentary Group on
Rendition have each corroborated, in whole or in part, the rendition and treatment

82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 34–35.
84. Id. at 37.
85. Id. at 37–38; see also Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
86. Oral Argument at 2:30, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (No. 08-15693EB), available at http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702.
87. See First Amended Complaint at 38, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798
(JW)).
88. Id. at 44.
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 48.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 48–49.
93. Id. at 50–51, 53–55, 56–58.
94. Id. at 58.
95. Id. at 58–59.
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of plaintiffs Mohamed and al-Rawi.96 In addition, five separate United Nations
bodies have corroborated all of the plaintiffs’ allegations.97 Extensive flight
records show that Jeppesen Dataplan participated in the transportation of each
plaintiff.98 In fact, records show, and the Council of Europe concluded that,
within a forty-eight hour period, Mohamed was transported on the same plane as
Khaled el-Masri from the El-Masri case.99
C. From the “Dark Side” to the Northern District of California
On May 30, 2007, Mohamed, Britel, Agiza, al-Rawi, and Bashmilah filed a
civil suit for damages in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California against Jeppesen Dataplan, a subsidiary of Boeing.100 The plaintiffs
alleged that Jeppesen provided the U.S. government with flight planning and air
transportation of the plaintiffs in their extraordinary rendition and torture.101 They
alleged two causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a U.S. federal law
that allows aliens to file tort claims against government officials for violations of
international law.102 Plaintiffs asserted ATS claims for forced disappearance and
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.103
On October 19, 2007, the U.S. government simultaneously filed a motion to
intervene and a motion to dismiss.104 The central argument of the motion to
dismiss was that information required to litigate the suit was privileged for reasons
of national security.105 The government argued that, under Totten, the very subject
matter of the lawsuit was a state secret and could not be litigated without
reference to the privileged information.106 The government further asserted that,
even if the very subject matter was not a state secret, the court should dismiss the
96. Id. at 59–60.
97. Id. at 60–61. These organizations are the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, and the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Id.
98. Id. at 61–66.
99. Id. at 62–63.
100. Motion to Intervene, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv02798 (JW)); see also Complaint, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
101. See Motion to Intervene at 3, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
103. Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d. at 1132. Although the Alien Tort Statute generally involves
state action, the plaintiffs in Jeppesen alleged that Jeppesen Dataplan conspired with the government
and aided and abetted the government in committing violations of the law of nations. See First
Amended Complaint at 66–67, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
104. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No.
5:07-cv-02798 (JW)); see also Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to the United States’ Motion to
Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1128
(No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
105. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment at 22–24, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d. 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
106. Id. 12, 22–24.
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case because the plaintiffs could not make out a prima facie case without the
privileged information under Reynolds.107
The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
responded that, even if the government’s claim of privilege was legitimate, it
would be premature to dismiss the case before going through discovery of at least
nonprivileged evidence.108 The plaintiffs further argued that the very subject
matter of the case was not a state secret because use of extraordinary rendition
had been publicly acknowledged by administration officials and the foreign
governments that had investigated extraordinary rendition allegations.109 The
district court, however, was more persuaded by the United States. The district
court dismissed the action, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
Totten because the very subject matter of the lawsuit was a state secret.110
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed,
finding that neither the Totten bar nor the Reynolds privilege were grounds for
dismissal.111 The court emphatically disagreed with the district court, holding that
the very subject matter theory of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
only applied in Totten cases premised on secret agreements and not merely where
the Reynolds privilege was invoked.112 The panel stated that Totten was meant to
apply only to cases in which the plaintiff had an espionage relationship with the
government.113 Having reversed the dismissal, the panel remanded the case.114
The Ninth Circuit then voted to hear the case en banc.115 On September 8,
2010, in a 6 to 5 decision, a sharply divided and impassioned court reinstated the
decision of the district court. The en banc court did not use the same theory as the
district court. Instead of using the very subject matter theory, the court relied
exclusively on the Reynolds privilege. It held that, even if privileged evidence were
excluded from the proceedings, there was an “unacceptable risk” that privileged
evidence would emerge during litigation (the “unacceptable risk theory”).116
Although the court admitted that it was possible for the plaintiffs to make a prima
facie case without privileged evidence, the court held that the risk of disclosure
was too great to allow the case to proceed.117
107. Id. at 11, 22–24.
108. Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
109. Id. at 32, 40–41.
110. Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
111. Jeppesen II, 579 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
112. Id. at 952–53.
113. Id. at 954.
114. Id. at 962.
115. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009).
116. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
117. Id. at 1087 (“Given plaintiff’s extensive submission of public documents and the stage of
the litigation, we do not rely on the first two circumstances in which the Reynolds privilege requires
dismissal . . . .”).
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In its opinion, the en banc court relied heavily on El-Masri v. United States, a
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision from 2007. The facts of that case are
nearly identical to the Jeppesen case. In fact, Ben Wizner, attorney for the ACLU,
was plaintiffs’ counsel in both Jeppesen and El-Masri.118 In that case, Khaled elMasri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, was arrested in Macedonia and
flown by Jeppesen, at the direction of the CIA, to Afghanistan.119 For the next six
months, el-Masri was tortured and interrogated in much the same way as the
Jeppesen plaintiffs.120 From very early on, CIA officials allegedly knew that el-Masri
had been mistakenly arrested.121 Eventually Jeppesen employees transported and
dumped el-Masri in Albania, and el-Masri later flew back to Germany.122 El-Masri
sued under the Alien Tort Statute and under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.123
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s
dismissal after the United States invoked the Reynolds privilege.124 The court
reasoned that state secrets were so central to the litigation of plaintiff’s claim that
it required dismissal.125 The court also held that the case could not be litigated
because nondisclosure of the privileged information could hypothetically deprive
the defendants of a defense.126
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE: EL-MASRI, JEPPESEN, AND
REYNOLDS AS A DE FACTO IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The Reynolds privilege, as the dissent in Jeppesen pointed out, was intended to
excuse defendants when they refused to produce documents during discovery, not
to require complete dismissal of a case, as in Totten.127 Jeppesen and El-Masri misuse
and confuse the privilege in three ways, each of which will be discussed in greater
depth in the following Section. These points of confusion create a growing nexus
between Reynolds and Totten, the latter of which should not have applied in either
Jeppesen or El-Masri because those cases did not involve secret government
agreements with the plaintiffs.128 First, the El-Masri court, like some other courts,

118. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
119. Id. at 300.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (finding a cause of action where a federal officer can be held civilly liable for violation of an
individual’s constitutional rights). See generally Michawl A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Bivens Actions—
United States Supreme Court Cases, 22. A.L.R. Fed. 2d 179 (2007).
124. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 301.
125. Id. at 302.
126. Id. at 309.
127. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
128. See supra note 55 and accompanying text for the proposition that Totten should only apply
in cases where the plaintiff entered into a voluntary relationship with the government.
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used the very subject matter theory, which was intended to be used exclusively in
Totten cases, to dismiss cases under Reynolds. Second, Jeppesen took Reynolds into the
realm of Totten through the rarely used unacceptable risk theory, which in
application bears a striking resemblance to the very subject matter theory. Third,
El-Masri, but notably not Jeppesen, further collapsed Reynolds and Totten by
prohibiting litigation on the grounds that nondisclosure of privileged evidence
could hypothetically deprive the defendants of a defense. Expanding the doctrine
in this way creates several problems. The most obvious flaw with the conflation of
these two doctrines, especially at the pleading stage, is that courts will more often
be forced to dismiss legitimate claims, depriving plaintiffs of their day in court and
precluding compensation for potentially outrageous harms.
A. Misuse of the Very Subject Matter Theory
The central problem with Jeppesen and El-Masri is that they confuse Reynolds
and Totten in their use of the very subject matter theory. Other courts have done
so as well.129 However, after Tenet v. Doe, it is clear that this is a mistake. The
Supreme Court is partly at fault for this confusion. The language the Court used
when discussing Totten and Reynolds is similar. For instance, the Court in Tenet,
even while distinguishing between the two doctrines, referred to Totten as invoking
the “privilege” rather than a bar or nonjusticiability doctrine.130 Nevertheless,
Jeppesen and El-Masri, together and individually, have moved toward a de facto
doctrine of immunity in place of the Reynolds privilege. In particular, El-Masri used
this theory as the basis of its dismissal despite the fact that the court applied only
Reynolds in its holding.131
The district court in Jeppesen provides an excellent example of how courts,
including the court in El-Masri, have failed to distinguish between Totten and
Reynolds.132 In dismissing the case on nonjusticiability grounds because the very
subject matter of the case was found to be a state secret, the court relied almost
exclusively on the Ninth Circuit’s 1998 opinion in Kasza v. Browner.133 Kasza was a
similar state secrets case that was dismissed at the pleading stage, purportedly
under Reynolds, because the very subject matter of the case was a state secret.134
129. See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to the “very
subject matter” characterization as an aspect of the privilege while citing to Reynolds); see also Hepting
v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (adopting Kasza’s problematic
mischaracterization).
130. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (“[W]here the very subject matter of the action, a
contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret, we declared that such a case was to be
dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action
should never prevail over the privilege.”) (second emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11, n.26 (1953)).
131. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304–05.
132. Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
133. Id. at 1134–35 (quoting Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166).
134. Id. at 1170.
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However, the Kasza court was mistaken in using this theory as a nonjusticiability
doctrine. As discussed below, this theory was meant to apply only to Totten cases.
In support of its decision to apply the very subject matter theory, Kasza cited only
to footnote twenty-six in Reynolds.135 Footnote twenty-six in Reynolds cited Totten
and read:
See Totten v. United States, where the very subject matter of the action, a
contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret. The action
was dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of
evidence, since it was so obvious that the action should never prevail
over the privilege.136
Thus, in Reynolds the Supreme Court merely cited Totten as support for the
absolute nature of the privilege.137 Yet this footnote has since become the
complete basis for using the very subject matter theory as a nonjusticiability
doctrine within the Reynolds privilege.
The three-judge panel in Jeppesen, which would have allowed the case to
proceed, explained at great length this misinterpretation of the Reynolds footnote,
which has unfortunately spawned an entire theory of dismissal:
Neither does any Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court case law indicate that
the “very subject matter” of any other kind of lawsuit is a state secret,
apart from the limited factual context of Totten itself. The Supreme
Court’s “very subject matter” language appeared in a footnote in Reynolds,
where the Court simply characterized “the very subject matter of the
[Totten lawsuit], a contract to perform espionage, [as] a matter of state
secret.” That brief passage did not signal a deliberate expansion of
Totten’s uncompromising dismissal rule beyond secret agreements with
the government, and we decline to adopt that expansion here. Tenet leaves
no doubt that the “sweeping holding in Totten” applies only to suits
“where success depends on the existence of [the plaintiff’s] secret
espionage relationship with the Government,” and that the state secrets
privilege does not otherwise “provide the absolute protection” from suit
available exclusively under “the Totten rule.”138
The en banc panel in Jeppesen recognized the error other courts made in
using the very subject matter theory, and the court criticized El-Masri’s
misinterpretation.139 The court explicitly stated the correct standard for the very
subject matter theory in describing the law.140 However, where the Jeppesen en banc

135. Id. at 1165.
136. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) (internal citations omitted).
137. Id. at 11.
138. Jeppesen II, 579 F.3d 943, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted); see also In re
Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the very subject matter theory was the
result of a footnote in Reynolds that referenced Totten).
139. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
140. Id. at 1077–78.

UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete)

7/14/2012 2:14 PM

2012] TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE

827

panel succeeded in its recitation of the law, it failed in the application. In a
footnote, the Jeppesen court explained the crux of its analysis:
Notwithstanding its erroneous conflation of the Totten bar and the
Reynolds privilege, we rely on El-Masri because it properly concluded—
with respect to allegations comparable to those here—that virtually any
conceivable response to [plaintiffs’] allegations would disclose privileged
information, and, therefore, that the action could not be litigated without
threatening the disclosure of state secrets.141
This is the point where the court privileged facts rather than evidence. In
referring to “privileged information,” the Jeppesen court referred to facts. There are
multiple evidentiary avenues a party can use to prove a fact. By closing all of these
avenues, where only one may be privileged, facts become privileged rather than
evidence. In privileging information or facts, rather than simply evidence, the
Jeppesen court applied the very subject matter theory; it simply altered the language.
The Jeppesen court relied on El-Masri and used the same approach in reaching its
conclusion. Even though the court acknowledged that El-Masri was mistaken in
using the very subject matter theory, it borrowed El-Masri’s reasoning in
misapplying Reynolds. In fact, the Jeppesen court relied on other courts that had
confused Totten and Reynolds in the same way El-Masri did.142 Jeppesen’s application
is indistinguishable from the very subject matter theory on which other courts had
erroneously relied.
What is perhaps most frightening about this line of reasoning is that the use
of the very subject matter theory in Reynolds would apply to any case involving
torture or extraordinary rendition. In application, a de facto rule would altogether
prohibit litigation of torture or rendition cases, even if plaintiffs could prove their
cases with nonprivileged evidence. These are cases that go to the very heart of a
free society, government accountability, human rights, and limitations on
government authority.
B. Unacceptable Risk of Disclosure Even with the Exclusion of Privileged Information
The court in Jeppesen identified a rarely used theory under which Reynolds
could be used to dismiss claims. This theory provides that a case should be
dismissed if litigating the case “would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing
state secrets,” even with the exclusion of privileged information.143 In asserting
this unacceptable risk theory, the Jeppesen majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim in
141. Id. at 1087 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. In addition to El-Masri, the Jeppesen court relied on Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347
(9th Cir. 2005) (using the very subject matter theory), and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166
(9th Cir. 1998).
143. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1083; see also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir.
2007) (“[A] proceeding in which the state secrets privilege is successfully interposed must be
dismissed if the circumstances make clear that privileged information will be so central to the
litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure.”).
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an unusual way.144 Very few cases had previously dismissed a claim using this
theory. Even some of the few cases cited by Jeppesen as support for this theory
were actually dismissed on other grounds.145 This is the least persuasive of
Jeppesen’s justifications and is troubling for several reasons.
The first reason why this is troubling is that there was no such risk in Jeppesen.
The plaintiffs in Jeppesen claimed that they could make out a prima facie case
without discovery, using only the nonprivileged evidence they had so far
gathered.146 Presumably, therefore, they would not need to examine witnesses
regarding anything close to the privileged evidence. In fact, if the plaintiffs could
have made a prima facie case without discovery it is conceivable that the district
court could have ordered summary judgment in their favor, assuming no facts
were in dispute. In this case, attorneys would never even need to examine
witnesses or introduce extra evidence that might include sensitive information. It
seems bizarre, therefore, that this was the theory upon which the en banc panel
dismissed the claim. This rationale is also problematic because courts following
Jeppesen may use it to dismiss similar claims that do not rely on privileged evidence.
The unacceptable risk theory is also troubling in a broader context. What
exactly would create an “unacceptable risk” is unclear. Jeppesen and its supporting
cases point only to the risk that a witness during examination may unintentionally
or unknowingly reveal privileged information.147 This is questionable in at least
two respects. First, is it really likely that during the course of litigation a witness or
attorney would accidentally disclose privileged information? Second, does this
actually protect secrecy?
It is highly unlikely that adjudicating cases implicating state secrets would
result in accidental disclosure of privileged material. The court’s witness
examination example does not credibly support this notion.148 Lawsuits such as
Jeppesen and El-Masri are highly sophisticated and are normally litigated by some of
the nation’s finest attorneys. The court can reasonably expect these attorneys,
typically litigating in teams, to lodge an objection when a question might implicate
state secrets. Government attorneys in particular will likely be highly trained and
informed with regard to all privileged information related to the case.149
144. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1088 (holding that “any plausible effort by Jeppesen to defend
against [plaintiffs’ claims] would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state secrets, even if plaintiffs
could make a prima facie case on one or more claims with nonprivileged evidence”).
145. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dismissing the claim against one
defendant because a prima facie case could not be made against him without privileged evidence);
El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308 (dismissing because the very subject matter of the case was a state secret).
146. Oral Argument at 21:05, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693EB),
available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702.
147. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1088; see also, e.g., Bareford v. General Dynamic Corp., 973 F.3d
1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1987);
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., Inc., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985).
148. See Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1088.
149. The United States Attorney’s Office has its own very extensive training department. See

UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete)

7/14/2012 2:14 PM

2012] TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE

829

Similarly, it is also reasonable to expect attorneys to have the foresight to
tailor their witness’s questions to appropriately limit potential disclosures.
Although judges may sua sponte make objections to inadmissible evidence,150 in
practice judges generally rely on attorneys to object if a question is privileged or
otherwise inappropriate. Of course, the harm that could result when an attorney
fails to object to a leading question is minor compared to the harm that may result
if an attorney fails to object to a question that induces a witness to disclose
privileged information. Nevertheless, when dealing with testimony regarding such
extraordinarily sensitive issues, it is incumbent upon the attorneys, witnesses, and
the court to adjust their awareness and caution accordingly. When conducting and
objecting to examinations of witnesses about extraordinary rendition, it is highly
likely that witnesses, attorneys, and the court will ensure that every word of
testimony is deliberate. It is conceivable, admittedly, that in all of the state secrets
cases the occasional witness might fail to censor his or her own speech and
mistakenly reveal privileged information, but this remote possibility is insufficient
to support the Jeppesen court’s unacceptable risk theory.
In addition, the court’s hypothetical underestimates witnesses’ ability to
regulate the scope of their testimony and the scope of witness preparation.
Counsel for the government could instruct witnesses before examination on how
to avoid using privileged information. Cases implicating state secrets involve
government activity at the highest levels of the executive branch. In fact, invoking
the privilege requires the personal approval of the U.S. Attorney General.151 It is
unlikely that attorneys, under these circumstances, will fail to properly control
witnesses and allow sensitive material to leak out. This unlikely scenario does not
justify the vastly more draconian result of dismissing these cases outright.
Nevertheless, there is admittedly some risk of inadvertent or accidental
disclosure. Although attorneys and witnesses may be held to a high standard in
cases such as Jeppesen and El-Masri, the prospect of an errant fax, misaddressed
e-mail, or rambling witness is not entirely imaginary. Moreover, it is conceivable
that secret information could be inferred through publicly available information.
For instance, a witness who was tortured may be examined concerning the injuries
he or she suffered. A thorough examination such as this may lead to inferred

Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Office of Legal Educ., CLE for Agency Counsel, JUSTICE.GOV,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ole/cle/index.html (last modified Sept. 27, 2010).
150. See 3 FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 13:37 (3d ed. 1984) (The judge
“may sustain objections on her own, even when not made by counsel. This is in line with her duty to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. Consistent with this duty, a trial judge may sua sponte object to
improper conduct or irrelevant evidence, and may also delete objectionable material from certain
documents originally admitted into evidence although there has been no objection.”).
151. See Eric Holder, Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Executive
Dep’ts and Agencies on Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege
(Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf.
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disclosure of secret interrogation techniques or other sensitive information. Thus,
there are two legitimate fears: that of the errant fax and that of inferred disclosure.
These fears are either mitigated or outweighed by other important interests.
First, attorneys and litigants in cases where state secrets are at issue are generally
extremely competent and will inevitably hold themselves to high professional
standards. No attorney would carelessly risk the tremendous reputational injury
and possible disciplinary action that could result from accidentally disclosing state
secrets. Second, these risks must be balanced against the need for the fair
administration of justice and government accountability. The Reynolds doctrine
does, after all, represent a balancing approach to the state secrets problem. When
balanced against such important values, the low risk of inadvertent disclosure is
tolerable. Lastly, every state secrets case will involve a certain element of risk.
Dismissal on this basis is troubling because any case that implicates state secrets
arguably poses this same risk. As such, any state secrets case could be dismissed
on this basis.
Another problem with the unacceptable risk theory is that, unlike the very
subject matter theory, the unacceptable risk theory is not fact-specific.152 The
benefit of a fact-specific analysis is that it is much more limited in scope. Thus, it
is considerably less likely to operate as an immunity or nonjusticiability doctrine.
However, that is not the case under the unacceptable risk theory. Because it is
unbounded by the facts of the case, the government could potentially use the
unacceptable risk theory to argue for dismissal of substantially more cases, even
where there is little evidence that state secrets will be revealed. The court’s only
justification for this principle suggests that witnesses may accidentally or
unknowingly disclose privileged information on direct or cross-examination.153
There will undoubtedly be direct and cross-examination of witnesses who possess
privileged information in almost every lawsuit that implicates state secrets. The
pervasiveness of this risk highlights the need for a foundational shift in handling
state secrets cases, a need that could be best satisfied with the creation of a subject
matter court.154
C. Dismissal Based on Deprivation of a Hypothetical Defense
One area in which El-Masri and Jeppesen diverge is the effect of a defense that
potentially lies within the privileged material. El-Masri takes the more expansive
view; in El-Masri the hypothetical loss of a defense through the exclusion of
privileged evidence is a basis for dismissal (the “hypothetical defense theory”).155
152. It is unclear whether the hypothetical defense theory, as mentioned by El-Masri, would
be fact-specific because the court does not explain how that theory would work in practice. El-Masri
v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2007).
153. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
154. See infra Part V.B.3.
155. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310 (“We do not, of course, mean to suggest that any of these
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The Jeppesen court, on the other hand, ruled out dismissal based on a hypothetical
defense, but allowed dismissal based on an actual defense: “If the [Reynolds]
privilege deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the
defendant a valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant summary
judgment to the defendant.”156 These grounds differ substantially from the very
subject matter and unacceptable risk theories cited by Jeppesen. In this case, the
dismissal would be, in effect, a grant of summary judgment.
The hypothetical defense theory is a dangerous expansion of the state secrets
doctrine. The El-Masri court asserted that even hypothetical defenses that might
not represent “the true state of affairs” could support dismissal.157 This standard is
purely speculative and would occur during a nascent stage of litigation. The ElMasri court did not explain how this theory would work in practice. The
hypothetical defense theory has since been rejected by every other circuit to
address this issue.158 There are good reasons why it has been so soundly rejected.
There is no reason why a defendant should not have to assert an authentic, if
general, defense rather than a conceivable defense. This could be done in a way
that does not reveal any factual information, such as through an ex parte filing or
under a gag order.
The hypothetical defense theory could apply to any case as it is based on
speculation. This is a true expansion of Reynolds into a nonjusticiability doctrine. It
is unlikely that a plaintiff would be capable of successfully litigating a claim with
this standard in place. However, El-Masri appears to be an outlier in this respect,
as even Jeppesen did not use this approach.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH OVERINCLUSIVE DISMISSAL: DISMISSAL OF
LEGITIMATE CLAIMS AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT SECRECY
An expansion of Reynolds into the realm of Totten might be appropriate if this
expansion served the interests of national security. In the absence of this
justification, the only effect is to deprive plaintiffs of legitimate claims while
undermining the principles the legal system serves to protect—the very same
principles the court in Jeppesen admittedly struggled to balance.159 Jeppesen and
El-Masri do not serve the interests of national security for two reasons. First, the
facts that the government sought to conceal were already known to the general

hypothetical defenses represents the true state of affairs . . . .”).
156. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Kasza v. Browner, 133
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Tenenbaum
v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th
Cir. 1992).
157. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310.
158. See Tenenbaum, 372 F.3d at 777–78; Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141; Zuckerbraun v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991).
159. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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public. Second, intense secrecy breeds distrust of the U.S. government among
foreign governments and peoples.
On the surface, the most apparent danger of the Jeppesen and El-Masri
approach is that plaintiffs with legitimate claims may be denied their day in court
and prevented from obtaining compensation for their injuries. However, the
danger goes much deeper than that. Rendition, torture, and forced disappearance
are not ordinary allegations or theories of recovery. The claims in Jeppesen and ElMasri come at a crossroads between liberty and authoritarian government. With
the blurring of the lines of the privilege comes the traditional slippery slope danger
of continuous expansion of government authority. The danger is further
exacerbated by the values the privilege tends to compromise—the values of
transparency, accountability, human rights, and limits on government authority.
A slightly more subtle danger is the possibility that the government will
invoke the privilege to effectively insulate government actions from judicial review
even when state secrets are not actually at stake. In some cases, Reynolds might
even preclude judges from reviewing the government evidence supporting the
claim of privilege “alone, in chambers.”160 If even judges cannot review claims of
privilege, it would be one of the few areas where there would be no check on the
executive branch. More worrisome, the privilege resides in areas where
government skepticism should be at its peak: military and national security affairs.
Taken to an extreme, the executive branch could target rival political figures for
detainment, extraordinary rendition, interrogation, or other illegal acts, and then
insulate its actions from future judicial review by arguing that the sensitive nature
of the evidence necessitates dismissal. Thus, in cases where significant evidence of
government wrongdoing is not public, the executive’s power to have lawsuits
dismissed, forever hiding their contents from the public, is a supremely powerful
tool. The privilege is so powerful that, if used without supervision, it could have
dire consequences.
In many cases, there will be little or no national security interest in
concealing the evidence because it will already be public. For example, the tragic
irony of Jeppesen and El-Masri is that the dismissal of those claims likely did very
little to protect secrecy. For instance, the defendants in Jeppesen argued that the
claim must be dismissed at the pleading stage because allowing Jeppesen to file a
responsive pleading would require Jeppesen to either admit or deny a relationship
with the government—a state secret.161 But this relationship was already publicly
known to exist. The CEO of Jeppesen was on the record before the media
admitting that Jeppesen Dataplan conducted the government’s torture flights.162
Concealing this fact during litigation, therefore, accomplished nothing to protect
160. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
161. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
by the United States, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)).
162. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1106 (appendix) (Hawkins, J. dissenting).
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its secrecy. In fact, the publicly available information on the rendition flights was
so extensive that the dissent in Jeppesen elected to attach an appendix summarizing
over 1,800 pages of information submitted by the plaintiffs.163 It is ironic that the
Jeppesen majority claimed to be protecting privileged information when the very
publication of its opinion led to the widespread dissemination of privileged
information. The existence of this voluminous and publicly available information
makes it crystal clear that very little of that non-public information would have
been litigated because this voluminous evidence was likely sufficient to prove the
plaintiffs’ case. Considering almost everything was already publicly known, the
security interest in preventing the lawsuit from progressing was minimal.
Even if the litigation did result in disclosure of information, it is possible that
this information would have been publicly disclosed anyway by the plaintiffs via
the media. It is difficult to imagine that the Jeppesen litigation would have revealed
anything that the plaintiffs at least did not already know. The five plaintiffs were,
after all, incarcerated for years and interacted with a myriad of U.S. officials.
Further, everything they learned could be freely reported to the media, as was the
case with Khaled el-Masri.164 Because of this, whether the secret information came
out through a plaintiff’s interview with the media or through a judicial opinion,
the effect would have been the same: to place security at risk. It is hypothetically
possible that, had Jeppesen proceeded, a dangerous state secret that none of the
plaintiffs knew about would have come out, resulting in disaster for the United
States, but this is unlikely. Moreover, this concern is better addressed through
reform of the state secrets doctrine rather than through any of the Jeppesen
theories. In particular, this hypothetical would never arise were the case litigated in
a subject matter court designed to handle such matters.
V. SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Having painted a dark picture using the opinions of Jeppesen and El-Masri, it is
useful to look at ways of brightening the canvas. There are several methods
through which this can be accomplished. First, given that the state secrets doctrine
has developed through the common law, there certainly must be an alternative
judicial approach to reform the doctrine. Of course, this may not solve the entire
problem. Larger, more structural changes to the doctrine are also appealing. In the
alternative, Congress has the authority to shape the doctrine from the top down in
the form of legislation. Each of these solutions, while improving upon Jeppesen and
El-Masri, leave open certain holes. There is, however, at least one solution that
largely protects state secrets and the rights of litigants: the creation of a subject
matter court.
163. Id. at 1095 n.2.
164. For one of the news reports resulting from el-Masri’s interviews with the media, see
James Meek, They Beat Me from All Sides, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www
.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/14/usa.germany.
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A. An Alternative Judicial Approach: A Return to Reynolds
Despite the growing popularity of the Jeppesen/El-Masri approach,165 not all
courts have allowed dismissal when plaintiffs were able to make out a prima facie
case with nonprivileged evidence. One alternative to Jeppesen/El-Masri is the D.C.
Circuit’s approach in Ellsburg v. Mitchell 166 and, more significantly, in In re United
States.167 Ellsburg is a traditional, status quo application of Reynolds. The case
emerged tangentially from the “Pentagon Papers” criminal prosecution in the
1970’s.168 The defendants and their attorneys from the prior criminal case alleged
that federal government officials had subjected them to warrantless wiretapping,
and sued several government agencies for damages.169 Although the government
initially admitted to conducting several of the wiretaps, it later refused to respond
to the plaintiffs’ other allegations on the ground that the evidence was protected
by the state secrets privilege.170 The court described the application of Reynolds
differently from either El-Masri or Jeppesen:
The effect of the government’s successful invocation of the state secrets
privilege, when the government is not itself a party to the suit in question,
is well established: “[T]he result is simply that the evidence is unavailable,
as though a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with
no consequences save those resulting from the loss of the evidence.”
Likewise, it is now settled that, when the government is a defendant in a
civil suit, its invocation of the privilege results in no alteration of
pertinent substantive or procedural rules; the effect is the same, in other
words, as if the government were not involved in the controversy.171
Ellsburg simply made the privileged material unavailable, an approach that was
affirmed in In re Sealed Case, which was decided the same year as El-Masri.172
The other D.C. Circuit case mentioned above, however, best exemplifies this
approach to the exclusion of evidence. In In re United States, the difference between
the Jeppesen/El-Masri approach and the D.C. Circuit’s approach is striking. In that
case, the plaintiff, through Freedom of Information Act requests, claimed that she
could make a prima facie case without discovery and without using privileged
documents.173 The court allowed the case to move forward, stating: “Denying
discovery, but letting the action go forward, is simply a less drastic solution than

165. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 52–54 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2010) (citing
exclusively to Jeppesen and Reynolds in its discussion of state secrets) (dismissed on other grounds).
166. Ellsburg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
167. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
168. Ellsburg, 709 F.2d at 52; In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
169. Ellsburg, 709 F.2d at 53.
170. Id. at 53–54.
171. Id. at 64 (quoting MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 233 (E.
Cleary ed., 1972) (footnote omitted)).
172. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 139.
173. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481.
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the outright dismissal authorized by our previous cases.”174 This stands in stark
contrast to the Jeppesen approach where the court dismissed the action despite the
plaintiffs’ claim that they could make out a case without privileged information.
The In re United States court also followed the Reynolds Court’s original intention of
allowing multiple avenues to discovery.175 In other words, the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged what the Jeppesen and El-Masri courts failed to embrace: that when
there are both privileged and non-privileged avenues to the same information,
either of which could make a prima facie case, dismissal is unnecessary.176
The D.C. Circuit’s approach in Ellsburg and In re United States does a better
job than Jeppesen and El-Masri of balancing government interests with the needs of
the plaintiffs. The simple concept of excluding evidence rather than dismissing
cases allows plaintiffs to attempt to make a prima facie case in spite of the
privilege.177 Nevertheless, even this approach has substantial problems. First, this
approach still allows courts to dismiss claims where a judge, in camera, verifies the
validity of an actual defense within privileged evidence.178 Ergo, a plaintiff cannot
critique that defense, attack it, contradict it, or otherwise contest its validity.
Nevertheless, as the court in In re Sealed Case pointed out, this is still preferable to
the hypothetical defense theory used in El-Masri, where even a hypothetical
defense could result in dismissal.179 Lastly, the D.C. Circuit’s approach remains
flawed in that it allows courts to dismiss cases based on privileged information
that is in the hands of the plaintiff and is therefore no longer secret.180
Despite its flaws, the D.C. Circuit’s approach preserves the plaintiff’s access
to multiple evidentiary methods of proving the same facts. Jeppesen and El-Masri, in
dismissing cases even when a prima facie case could be made, represent a much
greater nexus between Reynolds and Totten. The D.C. Circuit’s approach, even with
its flaws, is preferable because it does not collapse the two rules. The D.C.

174. Id.
175. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11, (1953) (stating that the respondents could have
reached the necessary information through examination of witnesses, to which the government
agreed).
176. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481 (“At the same time, an action as to which a certain
avenue of discovery would compromise state secrets need not be dismissed if an alternative, nonsensitive avenue of discovery is available. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that the Government
could prevent discovery of a sensitive report sought by plaintiffs in their wrongful death case arising
out of the crash of a military aircraft. The Court noted, however, that a readily available alternative to
disclosure of the sensitive information existed . . . to adduce the essential facts without resort to
material touching upon military secrets.”) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
177. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149–50.
178. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481–82.
179. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149–50 (stating that the hypothetical defense model would
mean “virtually every case in which the United States successfully invokes the state secrets privileged
would need to be dismissed . . . [resulting in] a system of conjecture”).
180. Ellsburg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Circuit’s approach may thus allow more claims to go forward in the D.C. Circuit,
as opposed to the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.
B. Opportunities for Structural Reform
1. Congressional Alternatives: Legislative Reform
One intriguing proposal is Congress’ State Secrets Protection Act (SSPA).181
The SSPA, in essence, is aimed at administering a new set of procedures for judges
to handle state secrets cases. The proposed law would allow claims to proceed
while still preserving the secrecy of privileged information.
The SSPA begins by defining the term “state secret.” Seemingly obvious, this
is important, as no court has given a more precise definition of the term than that
offered by Reynolds decades ago.182 Reynolds described state secrets as “matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”183 In contrast,
the SSPA defines a “state secret” as “any information that, if disclosed publicly,
would be reasonably likely to cause significant harm to the national defense or
foreign relations of the United States.”184 There are several notable differences
between these definitions, such as the SSPA’s limitation to the United States and
the “reasonably likely” qualifier. However, of more subtle importance is the
requirement that the information be “disclosed publicly” rather than “divulged.”
“Disclosed publicly” leaves open the possibility that plaintiffs could use sensitive
evidence if it was disclosed under seal or in camera.
The SSPA provides a plethora of mechanisms to preserve the secrecy of
information during litigation of state secrets claims. For instance, the SSPA
requires that courts use the security procedures established in the Classified
Information Procedures Act.185 However, the most appealing aspect of the SSPA
is that it prohibits dismissal on state secrets grounds outside of limited
circumstances.186 The SSPA would allow for dismissal only if litigation in the
absence of the privileged material, or substitute material, would “substantially
impair the ability of a party to pursue a valid defense to the claim or
counterclaim.”187
The inclusion of nonprivileged substitute material is another significant

181. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009). A similar bill was proposed in
the House of Representatives. See H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009).
182. See, e.g., Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We do not offer a
detailed definition of what constitutes a state secret. The Supreme Court in Reynolds found it sufficient
to say that the privilege covers ‘matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged.’”) (citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
183. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
184. S. 417 § 4501.
185. Id. § 4507(a).
186. Id. § 4503(b).
187. Id. §§ 4505(1), (3).
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feature of the SSPA. It requires that the government provide a nonprivileged
substitute when material evidence is excluded as privileged.188 If a nonprivileged
substitute is not provided, then the court can resolve the factual dispute in favor
of the civilian party.189 This mechanism amply protects plaintiffs in state secrets
cases. Requiring nonprivileged substitutes ensures that as much evidence as
possible is made available to plaintiffs. Further, it would discourage the
government from asserting the privilege frivolously.
Unfortunately, both the Senate and the House bills have not been active
since 2009.190 Additionally, several of the Senate sponsors are no longer sitting.191
Considering this, it is difficult to imagine that a bill similar to the SSPA will
become law unless a dramatic national event occurs to alter the lack of
momentum.
2. Congressional Alternatives: Oversight
Another option for effectively limiting application of the privilege is
establishing a Congressional oversight committee to review the executive branch’s
invocation of the privilege. There are advantages to this alternative. Members of
Congress certainly can be trusted with knowledge related to state secrets, although
one could still argue they lack the same expertise as the executive. Moreover,
congressional authority to conduct such investigations is well established.192 A
simple method of implementing congressional oversight would be to add an
additional step in the Reynolds procedure for invoking the privilege. For instance, in
addition to having the Attorney General personally review the claim of privilege, a
congressional oversight committee could be required, perhaps even as part of the
Reynolds test, to approve the use of the privilege.
For historical precedent, one can look to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI), which have monitored the CIA for decades.193 The Independent
Counsel Statute is a good practical model.194 This statute allows the Attorney
General to appoint independent counsel to conduct investigations of high-ranking
individuals such as the president, vice president, department heads, and the
188. Id. § 4504(f), (g).
189. Id.
190. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/111/s417; State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr984.
191. For example, one of the sponsors, the late Senator Edward (“Ted”) Kennedy, died in
August of 2009. Ted Kennedy Dies of Brain Cancer at the Age of 77, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/TedKennedy/story?id=6692022#.TyonT1zy8z0.
192. See generally 91 C.J.S. United States § 34 (2011).
193. James S. Van Wagenen, A Review of Congressional Oversight: Critics and Defenders, CIA.GOV
(Jan. 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/wagenen.html; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1614 (2006).
194. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (2006).
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director of the CIA.195 The Independent Counsel Statute grants Congress
jurisdiction over the independent counsel’s conduct, in addition to requiring
reporting.196 Similarly, the Attorney General could be required to appoint
independent counsel to evaluate and defend state secrets actions. The independent
counsel would then be required to report to Congress, perhaps before a formal
invocation of the doctrine at the district court level. This would give Congress the
chance to push back, if necessary, on the executive branch’s use of the privilege.
In the alternative, Congress could simply pass a statute that requires the Attorney
General to obtain the approval of a congressional oversight committee, such as
the SSCI or HPSCI, before approving the invocation of the privilege (as required
by Reynolds).
Nevertheless, there are problems with such a mechanism. The risk of
politicizing national security measures may be undesirable. Second, it is debatable,
some would say doubtful, whether members of Congress have any more national
security expertise than the judiciary. On the other hand, Congress often deals with
immense issues of national security, such as implementing the Patriot Act or
funding specific Department of Defense projects. Congressional oversight can
take so many forms that it is difficult to imagine that some of these concerns
cannot be obviated. Lastly, there are a multitude of congressional oversight
committees that have debatable effectiveness. It would surprise very few if such a
committee either acted as a rubber stamp or otherwise approached the function
with apathy. Despite these flaws, congressional involvement in the privilege would
certainly be a step in the right direction.
3. A Judicial Alternative: In Camera Trials and a Subject Matter Court
If secrecy is the problem with litigating privileged information, then there
must be methods to litigate cases while preserving secrecy. There must be a
middle ground between public disclosure and complete dismissal. In camera trials
or, ideally, a subject matter court are the most complete solutions to problematic
state secrets cases because they would nearly eliminate the secrecy problem from
the proceedings.
In camera trials could meet this need. This idea has been suggested by courts
before; in one instance a court even suggested that all counsel and even the
stenographer receive security clearances before proceeding to an in camera trial.197
Cases could proceed as bench trials under permanent seal. This would eliminate
almost any risk of exposure of state secrets. Aspects of this approach have also
been suggested by courts as possible solutions.198 Nevertheless, there are at least
195. Id.
196. Id. § 595.
197. Farnsworth Cannon v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980).
198. Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Finally, sealing of records and secret
hearings are possible ways to adjudicate issues without public exposure of state secrets.”), rev’d, 544
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three significant problems with this approach. First, cases implicating state secrets
may require a certain level of expertise that most judges do not have. Second, the
judge would have to make all factual and legal determinations alone. However, in
one variation of this model, it would be conceivable to utilize attorneys bound by
court order not to divulge state secrets outside of the litigation; the threat of
disbarment, contempt, or other sanctions should be sufficient to prevent secrets
from leaking out. Lastly, the benefits of an open judicial system would be lost.
Overall, the creation of a subject matter court is the most attractive
alternative.199 A model for such a court already exists in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC).200 This court has a very similar purview as a potential
state secrets court in that it monitors secret intelligence-gathering activities that
implicate national security. FISC decides whether or not to grant highly secretive
intelligence-gathering warrants to the government concerning electronic
eavesdropping—often in matters dealing with national security.201 In fact, FISC’s
jurisdiction could simply be expanded to include cases implicating state secrets. As
experienced federal judges dealing mostly with so-called paper trials while serving
on FISC, it would be a smooth transition for this court to adopt a new docket.
This solution is more convenient because it simply expands the docket of an
already existing and amply qualified court. Additionally, there has already been
some overlap between FISC issues and state secrets cases. For instance, in AlHaramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, one of the parties argued that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) statute preempted the state secrets
privilege.202 The Ninth Circuit did not decide that issue because it was not raised
in the district court, but the court did compare the statutory approach of FISA
with the common law approach of the state secrets privilege.203 Although there are
many benefits to expanding FISC’s jurisdiction, critics might see it as a
concentration of power in an already mysterious entity. Further, the creation of an
entirely new subject matter court would allow Congress to design a court specific
to the needs of state secrets cases.
Whether FISC’s jurisdiction is simply expanded or a new court is created
from scratch, there are numerous advantages to a subject matter court. A subject
U.S. 1 (2005); see also, e.g., In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Halpern v. United
States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958).
199. Professor Robert M. Chesney, of Wake Forest University School of Law, advocates for
this solution as well. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1313 (2007).
200. The FISC court is a product of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50
U.S.C. § 1803 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
201. See Eric Lightblau, Judges on Secretive Panel Speak Out on Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2006, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/politics/29nsa.html.
202. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).
203. Id. at 1206. It should be noted that one district court did find that FISA preempted the
state secrets privilege in electronic surveillance, partly abrogating the privilege. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency
Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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matter court has the potential, depending on the individual judges appointed, to
render moot the oft-cited argument that Article III judges do not have the
expertise to make judicial determinations regarding state secrets and should thus
defer to the executive branch.204 FISA presents a straightforward model for the
selection of FISC judges: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court selects district
court judges to fill seats on FISC.205 In creating a subject matter court, the same
approach could be used. In the alternative, each federal circuit could select one of
its members to sit by designation on the subject matter court. These selection
procedures would arguably ensure that the judges were insulated from the political
process and qualified to handle state secrets cases with appropriate expertise.
The most significant problem with the creation of a subject matter court
relates to plaintiff participation. Congress may have to limit plaintiff participation,
to a certain extent, to prevent plaintiffs from learning sensitive information. For
instance, if the court needed to examine documents detailing the coordinates of
secret military installations, the plaintiff likely could not participate in a hearing on
the matter or be served briefs, motions, or other documents with such details. The
extent of this limitation would depend upon the individual circumstances of the
case. If the entirety of the claims at issue were privileged, then it is possible that
the majority of the proceedings would occur in camera or under seal. However,
this could be remedied to a certain extent by using guardians ad litem. The court
could appoint individuals with appropriate security clearances to argue on behalf
of the plaintiffs in such circumstances. Or, if the sensitive information at issue is
minimal, the court could simply impose a gag order, with potential sanctions or
contempt if violated, on the parties and then allow full plaintiff participation. The
circumstances of each case may dictate the nature of the proceedings. These
varying circumstances underscore the need for a specialized court that can adapt
to individual cases.
Despite the myriad of benefits a subject matter court offers, there are, of
course, some downsides. One of the central functions of the judiciary is
transparency. In camera hearings, private proceedings, and the permanent seal of
documents prevent the public exposure of governmental activity. Although
preserving this secrecy allows claims to proceed, it comes at the cost of public
knowledge. On the other hand, the public still benefits from the proceedings
because allowing the claims to proceed can deter the government from violating
the law in the same way tort law encourages the public to adhere to a standard of
care. Nevertheless, the deterrent effect of public exposure is somewhat lost with
such a solution. Alternately, Congress could mitigate this quandary by requiring
the subject matter court to have closed hearings where attorneys for both sides

204. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 13:55, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 0815693EB), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702.
205. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
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participate under court-ordered confidentiality. A gag order on attorneys sworn to
uphold the law may be sufficient to ensure the secrecy of sensitive material.
However, this variation would require placing a great deal of trust in attorneys.
Despite its flaws, in camera trials or a subject matter court would go a long way to
allowing plaintiffs to litigate legitimate claims. In its application, a subject matter
court, FISC or otherwise, would satisfy the two most important considerations:
protecting secret information and allowing plaintiffs with legitimate claims to have
their day in court.
Overall, the subject matter court is more advantageous than congressional
proposals like the State Secrets Protection Act. First, a subject matter court could
be composed of judges with expertise in national security or foreign relations.
Second, a subject matter court would offer the advantage, and the obvious
disadvantages, of a single location. A court in a single location would be better
equipped to ensure security, while some district courts may be unsecure for the
purpose of conducting in camera hearings of highly sensitive material.
Nevertheless, maintaining litigation in the district court of original filing would
have other advantages. District courts may be more convenient for plaintiffs, the
expense of creating a new subject matter court would be avoided, and a greater
diversity of judges would allow for a diversity of interpretation. In sum, a subject
matter court would not only allow for the greatest flexibility in reshaping the
doctrine, but would do so in the most effective, substantive manner.
CONCLUSION
There must be a balance between guarding state secrets and the values of
liberty and transparency. However, at some point this balance tips too far in one
direction. Jeppesen and El-Masri have reached that point. In Jeppesen the en banc
court recognized that there are cases where the interest of justice must be
sacrificed in the interest of national security.206 At times, this may be true. The
caveat is that expanding this sacrifice beyond instances in which it is absolutely
necessary presents great danger. Justice, transparency, and accountability are
simply too important to be so easily dismissed.
In addition to these larger goals of the justice system, the plaintiffs from
Jeppesen and El-Masri must not be forgotten. As illustrated in Section II, these
individuals underwent incredible hardship; they deserve some sort of
compensation. What makes their cases unique is that the cases were dismissed
regardless of whether they could make out a prima facie case with nonprivileged
evidence. When a legal system filters out perfectly legitimate claims that can be
proven without privileged information, there is, undoubtedly, something
fundamentally flawed.
The solutions discussed above are designed to correct this failure. A remedy
206.

Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete)

842

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

7/14/2012 2:14 PM

[Vol. 2:809

is available through the common law in an alternative judicial approach. However,
this would likely require the Supreme Court to issue a definitive and
comprehensive opinion on the subject, which the Court has been reluctant to
do.207 Structural remedies such as a subject matter court or increased procedural
safeguards could significantly alter the balance and are the best overall options at
this time. Of course, congressional action is necessary for such an undertaking.
These solutions are nevertheless more desirable than the continued confusion of
the Totten and Reynolds rules and the resulting dismissal of legitimate claims.
Other questions outside of these solutions still remain. Should the privilege
exist in cases where the executive branch has exceeded its constitutional authority?
Or in cases where violations of jus cogens have taken place? Should the privilege
exist at all? Is it time for a statutory framework to take the place of the judicially
fashioned framework? Each of these reflects legitimate concerns. While those
questions remain unanswered, it is frightfully clear that the balance struck by
Jeppesen and El-Masri tilts too heavily in one direction.

207. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (denying the
Jeppesen plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari).

